The Story
The German political establishment is watching the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) with a mix of dread and curiosity. The party, which began as a euroskeptic protest movement a decade ago and has since drifted steadily to the far-right, is polling at record highs in several eastern states. In Saxony-Anhalt, it could realistically win an absolute majority. That prospect raises a question that keeps political strategists up at night: would actually governing force the AfD to moderate, or would the AfD radicalize the very institutions it seeks to control?
This isn't an academic hypothetical. Across Europe, far-right parties have faced the same choice: soften your message to win power, or stay pure and remain in opposition. The AfD's own leaders insist they will not follow the path of Italy's Giorgia Meloni, who has tempered her post-fascist Brothers of Italy party since taking office. But the structural realities of German governance—coalition politics, federal checks and balances, constitutional constraints, and a skeptical civil service—may have other plans. The million-dollar question, as one analyst put it, is whether the system will change the AfD, or the AfD will change the system.
Context & Background
To understand the stakes, you need to know how we got here. The AfD was founded in 2013 as a single-issue party opposing eurozone bailouts. It attracted economists and conservatives who felt the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) had abandoned fiscal discipline. But the 2015 migrant crisis transformed the party. Under the leadership of figures like Frauke Petry and later Jörg Meuthen, the AfD pivoted hard to anti-immigration rhetoric, Islamophobia, and a general rejection of the postwar liberal consensus.
By 2017, the AfD had entered the Bundestag as the third-largest party, and the mainstream parties responded with a "firewall"—a cordon sanitaire refusing any coalition or cooperation. That strategy has held at the federal level, but it's fraying in the east. In Thuringia, a 2020 controversy erupted when the Free Democrats (FDP) and CDU briefly accepted AfD votes to elect a minister-president, breaking the taboo. The resulting backlash forced that minister-president to resign, but the damage to the firewall was done.
Now, the AfD is stronger than ever. Recent polls show it at 30-35% in Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia—levels that make it impossible to ignore. The party has also shifted its internal center of gravity. The more moderate, "national conservative" wing has lost ground to the radical "völkisch" (ethnic nationalist) wing led by Björn Höcke, whose statements have been deemed extremist by German intelligence. This internal battle is crucial: which faction would prevail if the party actually had to govern?
Different Perspectives
From the AfD's perspective, the party frames itself as a victim of the establishment. Leaders argue that the firewall is undemocratic—a refusal to accept the will of voters. They claim that other parties have copied their positions on migration and border control, proving the AfD's agenda is mainstream. The party's base sees compromise as betrayal. When asked about "Melonization"—the perceived softening of Giorgia Meloni—AfD figures are adamant: "Absolutely not with us." For their supporters, ideological purity is the brand.
Mainstream parties, meanwhile, are divided. The CDU, under Friedrich Merz, has flirted with harder-line positions on migration, partly to win back defectors. Some CDU state leaders in the east have suggested that cooperation with the AfD might eventually become unavoidable. "We cannot govern against the people forever," one CDU insider told me privately. But the SPD, Greens, and Left Party remain fiercely opposed, warning that any normalization of the AfD would erode democratic norms.
Academics and analysts offer a third view: that the AfD's radicalism is a feature, not a bug. Unlike traditional conservative parties, the AfD thrives on outrage and opposition. Governing requires making unpopular decisions, accepting compromise, and taking responsibility for outcomes. That could deflate the party's appeal. As political scientist Anna-Sophie Heinze notes, "The AfD has no experience of governing at any level. They don't know what it's like to have to implement a budget or respond to a crisis."
What's Not Being Said
One underreported angle is the role of Germany's federal structure. The AfD might win a state election, but it would still face a powerful bureaucracy, independent courts, and federal oversight. A state government cannot change immigration law, for instance—that's a federal competency. It cannot leave NATO or the EU. It cannot deport asylum seekers unilaterally. The gap between campaign rhetoric and actual power would be enormous.
Another overlooked factor is the AfD's internal contradictions. The party has a strong libertarian wing that opposes state intervention in the economy, and a statist, protectionist wing that wants to expand welfare for ethnic Germans. These factions agree on immigration and cultural issues, but on everything else—taxes, energy, social policy—they are deeply divided. Governing would force those divisions into the open.
Most coverage also misses the psychological dimension. The AfD's base includes many who feel humiliated by the political establishment—left behind by globalization, dismissed as "Nazis" for their views, and ignored by mainstream media. For them, the party's intransigence is a badge of honor. If the AfD compromised, it would betray that identity. But if it didn't compromise, it would fail to deliver anything. That's a no-win scenario that could either break the party or radicalize it further.
What Happens Next
Three scenarios are plausible. The first is "Italianization": the AfD enters a coalition, realizes it must compromise to govern, and slowly moderates. Its radical wing splinters off, leaving a more conventional right-wing populist party. This is what happened with Meloni and, earlier, with the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ). The second is "Hungarianization": the AfD wins power and uses it to systematically dismantle checks and balances, packing courts, intimidating media, and entrenching itself. This requires a supermajority and control of federal institutions—unlikely in Germany's system.
The third scenario is "permanent opposition": the AfD remains strong but never breaks the firewall. It continues to protest, polarize, and feed on public anger. This might be the safest outcome for democracy, but it's also the most corrosive, as it normalizes the idea that the system is rigged and that only extra-parliamentary action can bring change.
Key things to watch: the internal party congresses in 2025, where the moderate and radical wings will battle over the party's direction; the state elections in Saxony, Thuringia, and Brandenburg in September 2024; and the response of the CDU, which may decide to break the firewall in one state as a test case.
For Content Creators
Covering the AfD responsibly requires avoiding two traps. The first is false equivalence—treating the AfD as a normal party with legitimate policy differences, when its leaders have openly questioned Germany's democratic foundations. The second is panic—portraying every AfD victory as the end of German democracy, which can demoralize audiences and play into the party's narrative that the system is collapsing.
A better approach is to focus on the mechanisms that constrain power. Explain how federalism, coalition politics, and the constitutional court work. Profile the internal factions within the AfD. Interview voters who support the party—not to normalize their views, but to understand their grievances. The story isn't just about a party; it's about a society struggling with the gap between democratic ideals and democratic realities.
Finally, resist the temptation to predict. The AfD's trajectory will be shaped by events no one can foresee—a new migration crisis, an economic downturn, a scandal. Your job is to give your audience the tools to understand what's happening as it unfolds, not to tell them how it will end.
